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  In Democracy in America, Alexis de Tocqueville (1805-1859), a French aristocrat, 
intellectual and commentator on American society during the 1830’s, described the United States 
as a society marked by a general “equality of condition,” that is, by a lack of noticeable social 
and economic distinctions among the citizenry.1  For Tocqueville, this characteristic of 
democracy encouraged the formation of an informal political bloc he termed “the majority” - a 
group who would often elect demagogues to political offices, since the latter were best able to 
give voice to majority opinion.2  Furthermore, de Tocqueville believed that this group was not 
only capable of influencing, but also of controlling, the country.  To an aristocrat, not so far 
removed from a pre-revolutionary France governed by Estates, this was shocking.  (It had been 
traditionally assumed in Europe that the quality of individuals was more important than any 
numerical majority, and that the opinions and beliefs of a small number of aristocrats, the “best” 
people, counted for more, or at least should, than those of the uneducated masses.)  As a member 
of a family that had been threatened with destruction during the first French Republic, it was also 
                                                          
1 Alexis de Tocqueville, Democracy in America, Vol. 1, trans. Henry Reeve and Francis Bowen (New York: Vintage 
Books, 1945), 3. 
2 Ibid., 222. 
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frightening.3  It is no wonder that Tocqueville labelled this phenomenon the “tyranny of the 
majority.”4  Political sociologist Clause Offe argues that de Tocqueville believed that this 
tyranny could also eventually lead to a significant growth in the size and power of government at 
all levels.5  In twentieth century America, these leveling tendencies, and the tyranny of the 
majority, have found expression in the growth of big government.  In this regard, de Tocqueville 
was remarkably prescient. 
 Offe’s analysis is central to the question that this thesis addresses – which is, is the 
present state of civil associations, operating outside of government, and thus sometimes in 
opposition to majority opinion, able to preserve individual dissenting voices from the “group 
think” that frequently finds expression in the actions of big government, typified by the programs 
initiated first by Franklin Roosevelt’s New Deal and continued in the post-World War II 
American welfare state? 
It now becomes necessary to define terms.  A “civil association” is a group of citizens 
who freely and without coercion organize outside of government control to promote some 
special end, whether “social” or “political.”6  A “voluntary association” is a civil association 
devoted to achieving some local community goal, while a “political association” is designed to 
accomplish some political end.7  Typical examples of the activities of voluntary associations are 
religious instruction provided by church groups, community events and street fairs supported by 
                                                          
3 William Doyle, The French Revolution: A Very Short Introduction (New York: Oxford University Press, 2001), 33; 
Jeremy Popkin, A History of Modern France. Third Edition (Upper Saddle River NJ: Pearson Education, Inc., 2006), 7, 
8; Hugh Brogan, “Introduction” in Ancien Régime and the Revolution (London: Penguin Books, 2008), xi. 
4 Thomas Clark, “’The American Democrat’ Reads ‘Democracy in America’: Cooper and Tocqueville in the 
Transatlantic Hall of Mirrors” Amerikastudien / American Studies 52 (2007), 188. 
5 Clause Offe, Reflections on America: Tocqueville, Weber & Adorno in the United States (Malden MA: Polity Press, 
2005), 29; Alexis de Tocqueville, Democracy in America, trans. Elizabeth Trapnell Rawlings.  (Boston MA: Bedford / 
St. Martin’s, 2008), 116. 
6 Tocqueville, Democracy in America Vol. 1, trans. Henry Reeve and Francis Bowen, 199, 202; Alexis De Tocqueville, 
Democracy in America, trans. Elizabeth Trapnell Rawlings, 116. 
7 Tocqueville, Democracy in America Vol. 1, trans. Henry Reeve and Francis Bowen, 199; Tocqueville, Democracy in 
America, trans. Elizabeth Trapnell Rawlings, 116. 
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local businesses, and the charitable endeavors promoted by groups like the Knights of Columbus 
and the United Way.  Examples of the activities of political associations are citizens organizing 
for the provision of vouchers or tuition tax credits for private elementary and high schools, 
neighborhood associations attempting to ban pornography in their hometowns, and local groups 
trying to set limits on what they perceive to be the excessive salaries and benefits provided to 
public officials.8 
De Tocqueville’s analysis does seem to make one thing clear.  The tyranny of the 
majority, under present circumstances, is contributing to the continued growth of government.9  
At the same time, it is also true that the growth of government has in turn increasingly been 
strengthened the tyranny of the majority.  This work therefore poses a second question.  If civil 
associations cannot at present control the growth and power of government, are there any 
methods by which they can be strengthened, and the historical ideal of “limited government” be 
retrieved?   
This work, rooted in historical analysis, argues that American society is heading down a 
particular path, i.e., toward an omnipotent government and, conversely, toward an impotent set 
of civil associations.  It also suggests that this is in part the product of Americans having become 
increasingly unable to deal with the uncertainties of modern life, leading to a state that Émile 
Durkheim has called “anomie.”10  Many Americans have not opposed the growth of government, 
because they see this as a particularly effective means of assuaging the personal, psychological, 
and economic insecurity common during the Great Depression and post-World War II eras.  For 
them the state has become an all-embracing protector in a world that they believe they can 
                                                          
8 Edward C. Banfield, “A Critical View of the Urban Crisis” The Annals of the American Academy of Political and 
Social Science 405 (1973), 8. 
9 Clause Offe, Weber, Tocqueville and Adorno, 29. 
10 Lewis Coser, Masters of Sociological Thought: Ideas in Historical and Social Context.  Second Edition (New York: 
Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, Inc., 1977), 132, 133, 135. 
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neither understand nor control.  This fearful and passive attitude works against the determination, 
courage and sense of purpose that animates the citizens of all strong and healthy societies.  It 
therefore poses a great danger to the American republic. 
While feelings of insecurity and anomie have long pre-dated the 1930s, responses to 
these have traditionally involved participation in local associations such as churches and 
neighborhood organizations, as well as of course family.  Today, the role of aiding people in 
their social and personal angst has been usurped more and more by government agencies.  Robert 
Nisbet has observed that the traditional way of dealing with personal and societal insecurity has 
been a “quest for community.”11  Yet it is precisely the decline of community that has been one 
of the most noticeable phenomena of twentieth century American life.12   
A key turning point in this change was the catastrophic collapse of the free market 
economy between 1929 and 1933 that resulted in massive, albeit temporary, unemployment.  
One of the most important long term effects of this pivotal moment was the growth of large scale 
government bureaucracies that today not only deal with the problem of unemployment, but have 
expanded into an increasing number of functions that include health care and education. 
In Democracy in America, Alexis de Tocqueville had suggested that joining voluntary 
associations – one type of civil association – provided a way of both creating and preserving 
community.  However, many contemporary Americans, instead of summoning up the 
commitment and dedication to work that is required to build and maintain civil associations, 
have taken the path of least resistance by allowing and supporting the rise of governmental 
organizations that have rendered formerly effective civil associations both superfluous and 
impotent.   
                                                          
11 Robert Nisbet, The Quest for Community (Wilmington DE: ISI Books, 2010), xvii. 
12 Offe, Weber, Tocqueville and Adorno, 35; Nisbet, The Quest for Community, xvii. 
viii 
 
The case of unions, as one kind of “civil association,” is instructive.  Greatly 
strengthened by the 1935 Wagner Act (the National Labor Relations Act), they were once vital in 
protecting the material and political interests of many American workers.13  Despite government 
protection, they were free standing, independent organizations organized by private citizens to 
defend against other private organizations such as modern industrial corporations.  Today they 
have increasingly been co-opted by a Democratic Party that by its very nature is associated with 
government at all levels.  In a variation of Max Weber’s famous dictum, that “charisma” that had 
informed their creation has become “routinized,” unions today benefit Democratic Party 
politicians more than the average “rank and file” member.14  Even more strikingly, the general 
indifference of unions to those outside their organization, and especially to the welfare of society 
at large, has become increasingly harmful to the general public.  This is particularly true of 
public-sector unions that have frequently worked in tandem with Democratic politicians to win 
high pay and very generous pensions at the expense of the taxpayer.15 
One key purpose of this thesis is to investigate how effective or not civil associations 
have been in challenging twentieth-century sentiment in favor of the expansion of government.  
Conversely, it suggests the ways in which government has weakened the ability of civil 
associations to provide both meaning and direction for individuals and to protect the political and 
civil rights of the general population. 
At their very best, civil associations temper and weaken the tyranny of the majority - that 
eternally restless and occasionally dangerous political “lynch mob” - through the creation of 
internal divisions in society working at cross purposes with each other.  The effect of this is not 
                                                          
13 Joseph Rayback, A History of American Labor (New York: The Free Press, 1966), 341-342, 323. 
14 Max Weber, “The Nature of Charismatic Authority and Its Routinization” in On Charisma and Institution Building 
(London: The University of Chicago Press, 1974), 48-65. 
15 Fred Siegel, The Revolt Against the Masses: How Liberalism Has Undermined the Middle Class.  (New York: 
Encounter Books, 2013), 154, 158, 159, 172, 174. 
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only to reduce feelings of personal “anomie” by bringing individuals into informal association 
with others, but also to create a large number of interest groups that divide the majority in a 
variety of ways.  In doing so, following the thought of John Calhoun, the possibility of freedom 



















                                                          
16 William W. Freehling. “Spoilsmen and Interests in the Thought and Career of John C. Calhoun” The Journal of 
American History 59 (1965), 27, 28. 
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"Man is not free unless government is limited." 
- Ronald Reagan 
 
 
“The American Republic will endure until politicians realize 
they can bribe the people with their own money." 
- Alexis de Tocqueville  
 
"Government's first duty is to protect people, 
not to run their lives." 
- Ronald Reagan 
 
Introduction 
In predicting the growth in government in the United States, Alexis de Tocqueville’s 
Democracy in America makes two important, albeit seemingly contradictory, observations.  On 
the one hand, de Tocqueville claimed that “the Federal government is visibly losing strength.”17  
On the other, he was apprehensive about the presidency of Andrew Jackson (1829-1837), 
claiming that many Americans feared that men of Jackson’s ilk would give “a degree of 
influence to the central authority that cannot but be dangerous to provincial liberties.”18  
Combined with this, de Tocqueville made clear that he believed the state governments were even 
more tyrannical than the Federal government.19 
The size of American government has grown enormously since the time of Jackson.  
Lynn Marshall notes that Jackson was the first American president to create an important public 
sector bureaucracy in the United States.20  However, while the size of the Federal government 
did grow during the course of the nineteenth century, it should also be realized that it did so in a 
relatively slow and incremental manner.  The change was nonetheless significant. The 1887 
                                                          
17 Tocqueville, Democracy in America, Vol. 1, trans. Henry Reeve and Francis Bowen, 421. 
18 Ibid., 430. 
19 Ibid., 89, 90. 
20 Lynn Marshall, “The Strange Stillbirth of the Whig Party” The American Historical Review 72 (1961), 462. 
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creation of the Interstate Commerce Commission and the 1890 Sherman Anti-Trust Act are both 
examples of this.  The ICC was an attempt to control railroad rates.  Long desired by farmers, 
state laws controlling the railroads failed when they were found by the Supreme Court to be 
interference with interstate commerce.  The Commission nonetheless remained largely powerless 
until strengthened by the 1906 Hepburn Act, passed during the Theodore Roosevelt presidency. 
This not only strengthened the ICC, but also, at least in the minds of some, “throttled [the] 
international railroad and shipping business.”  The Sherman Act, likewise, “was used to break up 
[the] Northern Securities Company.”21  Although the passage of this legislation demonstrates 
that the size and growth of the federal government was more significant than it was during the 
antebellum period, Milton Friedman has observed that government spending, in 1929, was only 
3% of total gross domestic product, (barring of course periods of war).22  While the rate of 
growth was not particularly remarkable during the nineteenth century, the size, number, and 
influence of governmental organizations did increase remarkably later on, especially during the 
presidency of Franklin D. Roosevelt (1933-1945).23  (There was of course an even more 
remarkable increase in the amount of government interference and spending during the Second 
World War when, according to economist Robert Heilbroner and historian Aaron Singer, “the 
government placed over $100 billion in contracts” in its determination “to mount a gigantic war 
effort.”)24 
A shift in American public opinion contributed greatly to this change.  Federal agencies 
had been rapidly created to cope with the catastrophic collapse of the economy and a twenty-five 
                                                          
21 Burton Folsom Jr, The Myth of the Robber Barons: A New Look at the Rise of Big Business in America (Herndon 
VA: Young America’s Foundation, 2010), 125 
22 Milton Friedman, Why Government is the Problem (Stanford: Hoover Institution on War, Revolution and Peace, 
1993), 15. 
23 William R. Brock, Welfare, Democracy, and the New Deal (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1988), vii. 
24 Robert Heilbroner and Aaron Singer, The Economic Transformation of America (New York, Chicago, San Francisco 
and Atlanta: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, Inc., 1977), 205. 
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percent unemployment rate.  Democratic party leaders knew that this would immensely increase 
their popularity.25  This is ironic.  In Democracy in America, Alexis de Tocqueville was 
emphatic in arguing that supporting decentralization was a way of gaining the support of the 
American majority.  While this is a reflection of an antebellum political culture that, among other 
things, sought to protect the institution of slavery, it was also an indication of the general 
suspicion of the growth and power of government on the part of the American population at the 
time.26   
 There was thus a remarkable change in attitude between the nineteenth and the twentieth 
centuries.  This continued not only through the New Deal, but well into the post-World War II 
era and, indeed, up to the present.27  In other words, the existence of big government in America 
has increasingly become taken for granted by the American public.   
While the popularity of the New Deal programs is understandable considering the gravity 
of the economic crisis, the continued support for increased government interference in people’s 
lives after the war is not.  Roosevelt’s programs did not get America out of the Great Depression.  
Only the Second World War did that.28  The fundamental disconnect between the policies of the 
1930s and the war went long unperceived by the general public. (One must admit that even in the 
1930s some Americans challenged the massive growth of government.  But while there were 
some dissent, civil associations, they were, generally speaking, ineffective in challenging a 
public opinion that had become progressively more in favor of political centralization and big 
                                                          
25 Heilbroner and Singer, The Economic Transformation of America, 179 
26 Tocqueville, Democracy in America, Vol. 1, trans. Henry Reeve and Francis Bowen, 421, 420, 395. 
27 Phillips Bradley, “A Historical Essay” in Democracy in America: Vol. 2 (New York: Vintage Books, 1945), 465; 
Robert Higgs, Crisis and Leviathan: Critical Episodes in the Growth of Government (New York: Oxford University 
Press, 1987), 193; Jonathan J. Bean, Big Government and Affirmative Action: The Scandalous History of the Small 
Business Administration (Lexington KY: University of Kentucky Press, 2001), 4; John T. Flynn, The Roosevelt Myth 
(New York: The Devin-Adair Company, 1948), 183. 
28 Burton Folsom Jr., New Deal or Raw Deal?: How FDR’s Economic Legacy Has Damaged America (New York: 
Threshold Editions, 2008), 247. 
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government.)  But more importantly, America entered a period of unprecedented prosperity after 
the war, in part due to the devastation of all competing industrial economies.  It was an 
advantage that would last for almost thirty years.  The nation was therefore particularly 
prosperous in the 1960s.  Yet it was precisely in that decade that government penetration into 
areas previously outside of its traditional purview became most insistent and relentless.29  The 
most pressing question in the context of this thesis is why.  Alexis de Tocqueville provides a 
clue. 
 
On Alexis de Tocqueville’s Analysis of Civil Associations in American Society during the 
1830’s 
 
Before examining de Tocqueville’s ideas about civil associations and the positive 
ramifications that they had and might continue to have, it is first important to discuss a few of his 
assertions that are central to his understanding of democracy and American society.  In 
Democracy in America, he famously stated that: “the social condition of the Americans is 
eminently democratic; this was its character at the foundation of the colonies, and it is still more 
strongly marked at the present day.”30  Regarding political culture during the early 1830’s, he 
found, more specifically, an “equality of condition,” that is, that real wealth was somewhat 
evenly distributed, and that the differences in social status between members of the American 
citizenry were, relatively speaking, less evident than were the social distinctions found in 
Europe.31  Furthermore, de Tocqueville concludes that there was more freedom in the United 
States than in European countries, and that Americans were avowedly and enthusiastically 
                                                          
29 Charles Murray, Losing Ground: American Social Policy – 1950-1980 (New York: Basic Books Inc., 1984), 24. 
30 Alexis de Tocqueville, Democracy in America, Vol. 1, trans. Henry Reeve and Francis Bowen, 48. 
31 Ibid., 3. 
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champions of liberty and “republican self-government”.32  Being measured in his judgement, he 
also noted that “there exists in the human heart a depraved taste for equality, which impels the 
weak to attempt to lower the powerful to their own level and reduces men to prefer equality in 
slavery to inequality with freedom.”33  De Tocqueville thus not only observed what philosopher 
Max Scheler has termed ressentiment, but also asserted that the average American, in practice, 
values equality more than freedom.34  It was only in theory that liberty was held to be the highest 
value.  
De Tocqueville also noticed that the phenomenon of ressentiment, common throughout 
the American body politic, contributed to the creation of the aforementioned “majority.”35  He 
believed that many Americans, because they were morally weak and easily succumbed to 
jealously, often surrendered to the influence of public opinion - the political, social and cultural 
modes-of-thought that were popular among the majority at any particular moment.  De 
Tocqueville not only insisted that public opinion “really exists,” but that it had pernicious 
consequences, including shaping the outcome of elections and the formation of public policy.36  
For the author, these sentiments valuing equality over civil liberties led him to say “I know of no 
country in which there is so little independence of mind and real freedom of discussion as in 
America.”37  According to the author, Europeans actually debated religion and politics in a more 
open and friendly manner than did Americans.38  
                                                          
32 Ibid., 56; Brogan, “Introduction” xvi, xvii; Offe, Tocqueville, Weber & Adorno, 11. 
33 Alexis de Tocqueville, Democracy in America, Vol. 1, trans. Henry Reeve and Francis Bowen, 56. 
34 Ibid., 245, 3, 245; Max Scheler, Ressentiment, trans. Lewis B. Coser and William W. Holdheim (Milwaukee WI: 
Marquette University Press, 1994), 29. 
35 Tocqueville, Democracy in America, Vol. 1, trans. Henry Reeve and Francis Bowen, 421, 420. 
36 Ibid., 426, 271, 129. 
37 Ibid., 273. 
38 Ibid., 273. 
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De Tocqueville argued that this majority usually consisted of members of the lower 
classes, who, restrained neither by intellect or education, could “frequently display the tastes and 
the propensities of a despot.”39   He asserted that this is so because in America few are resigned 
to their place in life.  As a result, “[the] lower orders are agitated by the chance of success” to 
move up the economic and social ladder.40  Because they are invested with more political power 
than they previously had due to the establishment of universal manhood suffrage during the early 
nineteenth century, de Tocqueville suggests that they “unquestionably [exercise legislative 
authority.]”41  He concluded that “[universal] suffrage, therefore in point of fact does invest the 
poor with the government of society.”42  Encouraged to think boldly, “they discover a multitude 
of wants that they had not before been conscious of, and to satisfy these exigencies recourse 
must be had to the coffers of the state.”43  De Tocqueville viewed such expenditures resulting 
from government spending to be, in a word, “expensive.”44  It could also be dangerous. 
Tocqueville summarized his understanding of the American majority as follows: “What 
is called the republic in the United States is the tranquil rule of the majority, which after having 
had time to examine itself and to give proof of its existence, is the common source of all the 
powers of the state.”45  He believed that public opinion influenced American political culture and 
public policy, declaring that “[the] political maxims of the country, therefore, depend on the 
masses of the people.”46  Because they have “sovereign power,” De Tocqueville judged that they 
also had the power to “destroy or modify” political institutions at their pleasure.47  (As an 
                                                          
39 Ibid., 222, 280. 
40 Ibid., 208. 
41 Ibid., 222. 
42 Ibid., 222. 
43 Ibid., 224. 
44 Ibid., 233. 
45 Ibid., 434. 
46 Ibid., 135. 
47 Ibid., 180. 
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aristocrat descended from an ancient Norman family, and the son of parents first buffeted and 
then menaced by the French Revolution, his disquietude comes through frequently in his text.)48 
Given that de Tocqueville concluded that the majority influenced public policy through 
its control of the state, it is important to examine de Tocqueville’s rather original conception of 
the state.  For de Tocqueville, it was comprised of two entities, the “government” and the 
“administration.”49   He viewed government as a centralized state-apparatus at the federal level 
tending to the needs of the whole body politic, while conceiving an “administration” as a public 
sector entity operating at the state and local level.50  Although de Tocqueville was generally 
supportive of government at the federal level, it is also important to note that he was against the 
centralization of administration within the states.51  In other words, he saw a parallel between the 
tyranny of state governments in the United States and the tyranny of centralized government in 
his native France.52  This is very understandable at a time when states were all powerful, and the 
vaunted bill of rights of the American Constitution protected the individual only from the 
federal, but not from state, government.53 States from the beginning of the Republic had had the 
right to establish official religions, decide who could vote, and whether or not slavery would 
exist within their borders. 
De Tocqueville understood that the American majority had the potential to arrogate the 
privileges of the state, possibly leading to atrocious actions.  For instance, he noted that many 
                                                          
48 Frederick Brown, “Introduction” in Letters from America,  (New Haven CT: Yale University Press, 2010), viii, ix; 
Hugh Brogan, “Introduction,” xi; Tocqueville, Democracy in America Vol. 1, trans. Henry Reeve and Francis Bowen, 
100. 
49 Tocqueville, Democracy in America, Vol. 1, trans. Henry Reeve and Francis Bowen, 180, 206, 89, 90. 
50 Ibid., 89. 
51 Ibid., 250, 426, 250; Laurence C. Greene, Review of Democracy in America by Alexis de Tocqueville, The 
American Journal of Economics and Sociology 4 (July 1945), 556; Alexis De Tocqueville, Democracy in America, vol. 
1, 233. 
52 James T.  Schleifer, “Tocqueville and Centralization: Four Previously Unpublished Manuscripts” The Yale 
University Library Gazette 58 (1983), 29. 
53 This would only change with the passage of the XIV Amendment in 1868. 
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Americans, “backed by the tyranny of the government,” despoiled the Native Americans of their 
lands.54 He therefore advocated the formation of civil associations as a guard against any crime 
committed by majority-tyranny.55  He asserted that associations protected and promoted the 
common good of American communities.56  He also understood that civil associations should be 
local, tied to some particular township or county.57  In this way they could encourage virtue and 
good local government without aspiring to the overweening power that allowed government to 
commit great crimes.  He might also have understood that local civil associations operating in the 
smaller arena of a state could have greater effect than in the confines of the entire nation.  Just as 
the Founding Fathers had hoped to preserve liberty by fragmenting political power among the 
states, so de Tocqueville thought civil associations could work against potential majority tyranny 
within the states by atomizing that informal bloc that he so feared. 
As mentioned above, de Tocqueville made a distinction between two types of civil 
associations: political and voluntary.58  In Democracy in America, he first discussed political 
associations.59  He explained that this type of organization “is established to promote the public 
safety, commerce, industry, morality, and religion.”60  He subsequently elaborated upon their 
organizational structure, asserting that it “consists simply in the public assent which a number of 
individuals give to certain doctrines and in the engagement which they contract to promote in a 
certain manner the spread of these doctrines.”61  For de Tocqueville, these political associations 
would sometimes advocate unpopular causes, such as the abolition of slavery.  He stated that, 
                                                          
54 Tocqueville, Democracy in America Vol. 1, trans. Henry Reeve and Francis Bowen, 364. 
55 Ibid., 202; Tocqueville, Democracy in America, trans. Elizabeth Trapnell Rawlings, 116. 
56 Tocqueville, Democracy in America Vol. 1, trans. Henry Reeve and Francis Bowen, 199. 
57 Tocqueville, Democracy in America, trans. Elizabeth Trapnell Rawlings, 57-58. 
58 Ibid., 116. 
59 Ibid., 116. 
60 Tocqueville, Democracy in America, Vol. 1, trans. Henry Reeve and Francis Bowen, 199. 
61 Ibid., 199. 
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because these associations “do not represent the majority,” they could therefore make a positive 
contribution in challenging public opinion and the political power it represented.62   
Anti-slavery societies were, in fact, the most important type of political association that 
existed during de Tocqueville’s time.  Inspired by Christian thought, William Lloyd Garrison in 
1831 spearheaded a “New Abolitionist” movement that castigated slaveholders as evil.63   By 
1831, there were over 130 anti-slavery groups in the United States.64  Examples of anti-slavery 
societies during the time of de Tocqueville’s writing were the Manumission Society of North 
Carolina, the Philadelphia Female Anti-Slavery Society, “the Pennsylvania Society for 
promoting the Abolition of Slavery, the Relief of Free Negroes unlawfully held in bondage, and 
for improving the conditions of the African Race,” the New England Anti-Slavery Society, the 
American Colonization Society, the Massachusetts Anti-Slavery Society, the American Anti-
Slavery Society, the American and Foreign Anti-Slavery Society, the Liberty Party and the 
Tennessee Society for Promoting the Manumission of Slaves.65  (It might be noted that most of 
these societies were not interested in granting citizenship rights to freed slaves.  Instead, many 
were interested in sending freed slaves to colonies such as Liberia in Africa.)66 
De Tocqueville then discussed civil associations that are not primarily involved with the 
political sphere.  He calls these voluntary associations.  He describes their characteristics in the 
following way: 
                                                          
62 Ibid., 204. 
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 Americans of all ages and stations, all points of view, meet constantly.  Not only do they 
 belong to commercial and industrial associations, but there are countless others: religious 
 and moral, serious and futile, some very broad and others very specific, large and small; 
 Americans gather to celebrate holidays, establish seminaries, build inns, erect churches, 
 distribute books, and send missionaries to the far corners of the world; this is how they 
 build hospitals, prisons, and schools.67 
Relatedly, he also observed the formation of temperance societies in the United States.  Such 
voluntary associations he believed improved American society by promoting the common good 
and encouraging ordinary citizens to perform philanthropic acts for their local communities.68   
Temperance movements were in fact the most important type of voluntary associations 
that existed in the United States at the time.  People crusaded against the use of alcohol because 
they believed it led people down the path of self-destruction (including reducing the ability of the 
body to fight off disease.)69  Institutions that advocated temperance included Methodist groups, 
the Union Temperate Society, the American Temperance Union, the United States Temperance 
Union, the Congressional Temperance Society, the Washingtonian Total Abstinence Society, the 
New Haven Temperance Society of the People of Color, the New York Temperance Society, the 
Brooklyn (N.Y.) Temperance Association, the Home Temperance Society, the American 
Temperance Society, the American Moral Reform Society, the New England Colored 
Temperance Society, the Connecticut State Temperance Society of Colored Persons and the 
Temperance Society of the People of Color in the City of Pittsburgh.70  (According to historian 
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Eugene O. Porter, most temperance societies between 1826 and 1836 were interested in 
advocating “abstinence by pledge from ardent spirits” rather than “total abstinence.”)71 
Because of their grass roots nature, the voluntary association was one of the healthiest 
and most admirable examples of American democracy at work, eschewing government direction 
in favor of local independent initiative.  It is part of the argument of this thesis that the decline of 
this type of activity remains one of the great tragedies of modern political life. 
Noting this practical and pragmatic side of American culture, de Tocqueville asserted that 
industrial associations (another type of voluntary association) were even more important, in the 
minds of Americans at least, than political ones.72  (Examples of such associations were 
newspaper companies, labor unions and private-sector corporations.)73  De Tocqueville 
disagreed, thinking that political associations were ultimately more important than voluntary 
ones, since it was only the former that helped insure the existence of the latter.74  In fact, de 
Tocqueville was ardent in advocating the creation of political associations, given his fear that 
democratic societies would eventually devolve into tyrannical ones.  Worrying that democracies 
could potentially lack a sufficient number of effective associations of this kind, he concluded that 
“no measure must be taken to increase the rights of democracy,” that is, the tyranny of the 
majority, without a sufficient number of these.75  In other words, he believed that American 
politics was in part a conflict between those who wished the general good of society (through 
locally organized political associations) and those individuals who, being only motivated by self-
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interest and the desire for power, strongly supported tyrannical state control.  It is important here 
to distinguish between the aims promoted by the “tyranny of the majority” and what other 
scholars and moralists refer to as the “common good” or the “good of the community.”  Simply 
put, the former refers to a form of what in today’s parlance might be called “politically correct 
thought” that seeks to impose its opinions on society, while the latter represents what is right or 
wrong regardless of whether or not it is popular.  
Believing that democracy in America was not threatened by salutary political 
associations that move it towards the common good, de Tocqueville asserted that their existence 
was more necessary in democratic societies than under monarchies.  For de Tocqueville, 
monarchies, unlike democracies, consist of a “body of the noble and the wealthy,” which, 
although representing only a small minority of the population, collectively have enough prestige 
“[to] check the abuses of [royal] power.”76  Just as the French provincial parlements and noble 
lords checked the political power of kings throughout the history of early modern France, and the 
English House of Lords right up to his own time, he hoped that political associations in the 
United States might similarly reduce the power of self-serving majorities that existed in all of the 
individual American states.77  
To counter the possibility of democratic tyranny, de Tocqueville concluded there had to 
be a large number of effective political associations (such as anti-slavery societies, suffrage 
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movements and free soil groups) in order to check, and if need be challenge, the power of both 
the American majority and the government which was its expression.78   
Given that Alexis de Tocqueville thought that notions of “equality of condition” 
thoroughly informed American culture, he also feared that the United States would eventually 
enter a period of decline because of the lack of respect afforded to individual genius and 
creativity.  He believed that societal degeneration would occur in two stages.  During the first 
stage, a democratic society like the United States would need “artificial and temporary 
[substitutes],” that is, political associations, to replace landed and mercantile notables.79  As 
individuals similar to Washington, Jefferson, Madison, Franklin and Adams, who had 
represented the last remnants of an older, aristocratic political culture inherited from colonial 
America, had begun by the 1830s to experience a decline in political power and prestige, they 
had to be replaced by grassroots organizations.  The rigors of democratic practice prevented 
single individuals from any longer filling this absolutely essential function.  During the second 
stage, he predicted that “[the] more equal the conditions of men become and the less strong men 
individually are, the more easily [members of a particular association] give way to the current of 
the multitude and the more difficult it is for them to adhere to an opinion which the multitude 
discard.”80  It is this singularly unfortunate circumstance that became overwhelmingly apparent 
during the 1930s. 
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The Role of American Civil Associations during the New Deal Era (1933-1945) of 
Expanding Government: A Review of the Scholarly Literature 
 
In his article, “A Historical Essay,” Phillips Bradley concludes that both de Tocqueville’s 
analysis and prescription had become ever more salient during the 1930’s.  Observing the growth 
of government in America, as well as the emergence of Fascist and Communist movements 
elsewhere, he judged that de Tocqueville’s championing of political liberties and advocacy of an 
“equality of opportunity” philosophy would benefit the entire world.81  More specifically, 
Bradley documented that a tyrannical American majority - - what he labeled the “fourth power” - 
- had encouraged this growth of government.82   
Matthew Josephson provides a very different understanding of the role and functions of 
civil associations.  Instead of positing that they should be maintained to limit a potentially 
oppressive government, he believes associations such as unions had to exist to control 
“privileged groups,” such as corporate capitalist elites.83  At the same time, he supports the 
political centralization that was part of Roosevelt’s New Deal.  This was due to his conviction 
that the Federal government would be more successful in implementing policies for the common 
good than local associations which, he noted, had proven ineffective, since they did not have the 
resources to deal with a crisis as profound as the Depression.84 
August Nimtz Jr. has also studied the formation of civil associations in the United States 
during the thirties.85  Although contemporary Marxists were generally critical of them, Nimtz 
                                                          
81 Bradley, “A Historical Essay” in Democracy in America, Vol. 2, 437. 
82 The first three being of course the legislative, executive and judicial branches.  Ibid., 465. 
83 Matthew Josephson, “A Century after Tocqueville,” accessed July 1, 2016, 
http://www.vqronline.org/essay/century-after-tocqueville.  Virginia Quarterly Online. (Autumn 1938), 8. 
84 Ibid., 8, 9. 
85 August Nimtz Jr., Marx, Tocqueville, and Race in America (Lanham MD: Lexington Books, 2003), 183, 184. 
15 
 
points out that American Communists themselves formed organizations in the United States - - 
often referred to as “cells” - - that were highly instrumental in promoting Stalinism.86  He claims 
that there were at least 100,000 members of the American Communist Party who opposed what 
they saw as Roosevelt’s capitalist policies promoted by the growth of government.  Nimtz 
explains the ineffectiveness of these “Stalinist” associations by a lack of what Marxists call 
“class-consciousness,” due to the economic, ethnic and racial divisions between various elements 
of the American working classes.87 
To the disappointment of the radical Left, no mass revolution overthrew the capitalist 
system.  But despite the Marxist critique, most non-Marxist scholars do not think of Franklin 
Roosevelt simply as a capitalist.  Chilton Williamson, for instance, actually sees him as flirting 
with socialism.  Although Nimtz believed socialism was unpopular during the New Deal era, 
Williamson believed that it has become popular enough to become one of the chief legacies left 
by Roosevelt.88   
Williamson also notes that one of the effects of this was the growth of welfare 
dependency during the very prosperous post-World War II era.  He suggests that increasing 
dependency resulted more from personal and collective insecurity prevalent in the new American 
society than it did from the development of what Oscar Lewis has labeled a “culture of poverty” 
– that is, a culture that promotes the formation of instable families which have a “lack of order, 
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direction, and organization.”89  Due to the increasing acceptance of “soft” socialism (the 
provision of massive benefits, rather than the classical Marxist socialism of collective ownership 
of the means of production) and statism (the central role of the government in providing this 
largesse), Williamson is not surprised that civil associations that sought to challenge the 
centralization of the Federal government, whether the American Liberty League or the American 
Enterprise Institute, to name just two, became largely ineffective during the New Deal and 
afterwards.  His work provides a detailed account of the failures of significant popular protest 
movements, whether Left, Right or Center, against what sociologist Peter L. Berger and 
theologian Richard J. Neuhaus have called the “megastructures,” that is, the large government 
bureaucracies and private-sphere organizations that dominate the public sphere.90 
Chilton Williamson is certainly not the only one claiming that the popularity of “soft” 
socialism was one of the greatest, and most terrible, of the New Deal legacies.  (All this is very 
far from the views of Henry Steele Commager, who lauded the general acceptance by the public 
of Roosevelt’s policies, since these bankrolled insolvent private-sector businesses as well as 
providing public sector programs to the disadvantaged.)91 
Max Lerner understood that the social forces operating in the 1930s were far more 
complicated than being simply about providing new and different ways of assisting the 
unemployed.  According to him, Alexis de Tocqueville accurately foresaw the gradual formation 
of a “Leviathan State” during the Roosevelt administration.92  He might also have imagined a 
new constellation of private associations working against it.  Certainly, this was also a time, as 
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Lerner notes, when the “corporate barons” of the private sector “fought welfare laws and 
collective bargaining with every weapon.”93  Like Matthew Josephson, Lerner acknowledges the 
significant amount of influence that big business had through lobbying that worked relentlessly 
against a tyrannical majority made more terrible by state power, and an oppressive national 
consensus about the virtues of the New Deal, evidenced by Roosevelt’s resounding victory in the 
1936 presidential elections. 
 
An Appraisal and Interpretation of the Role of Civil Associations and Government in the 
United States during Franklin D. Roosevelt’s Presidency (1933-1945) 
 
Civil associations during the time of Alexis de Tocqueville had been small and local.  By 
the time of the New Deal, many were more substantial in size and less bounded by locality.  The 
rise of the railroad was mainly responsible for this.  It had not only created a “transportation 
revolution,” but also a more integrated “national” economy that tightly linked the agrarian West 
with the industrial East.94  They were also the first truly national corporations in that they drew 
on the resources and capital of the entire country. 
Two prominent neo-conservative scholars have also focused their attention on the large 
and powerful social institutions that dominated public life in the thirties.  Berger and Neuhaus 
have called both modern capitalist corporations and governmental institutions 
“megastructures.”95  While the New Deal led to the considerable growth of the Federal 
government, private sector corporations were also among the most dominant and influential civil 
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associations of the era.96  They also remained in almost constant tension with New Deal public 
sector programs.   
The New Deal programs were certainly unprecedented in size. The Works Progress 
Administration (1935-1943) alone employed 8,500,000 people, while the Civilian Conservation 
Corps (1933-1942), which employed over 3,000,000, were among the largest.97  Others included 
the Agricultural Adjustment Administration, which fundamentally distorted the free market 
agricultural economy by paying farmers not to grow food, and Social Security, a federally run 
old age retirement plan.  The National Recovery Administration, which coordinated a supposedly 
voluntary effort by industrial manufacturers to halt the downward spiral of prices and wages, was 
in fact yet another example of heavy handed federal interference in the economy.98  All of these 
were implemented with an enormous amount of government coercion.  As organizations such as 
these proliferated and grew, voluntary associations became weaker as members of groups such as 
the Moose, Elks, Knights of Columbus and League of Women Voters could no longer afford 
dues due to the economic effects of the Great Depression.99 
At the same time, there were many organizations and individuals who were vehemently 
opposed to Roosevelt’s policies.  One of the largest was led by outspoken Father Charles 
Coughlin, a reform minded priest from Royal Oak, Michigan who attempted to create his own 
reform movement through a civil association.  Inspired by Catholic social doctrines, he was 
simultaneously both anti-capitalist and anti-Communist.  An early supporter of Roosevelt, 
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Coughlin proposed that more silver coins be minted in order to stimulate the American economy, 
an inflationary policy that had been much favored in farm states since the late nineteenth 
century.100  This “radio priest” was soon to have an enormous national following, for the radio, 
like the railroads, had irrevocably brought the nation more closely together, allowing national 
movements to gain more prominence over regional ones. 
There was much that was unattractive about Coughlin.  His early reformism eventually 
degenerated into a shameless Jew baiting that ceaseless pilloried the people he claimed were 
responsible for most of the ills of the world. Many of his critics also came to believe that the 
association he created did not provide clear and convincing proposals for improving American 
society.  It is also quite possible that the size of government would have actually grown more 
than it did under Roosevelt if they had been implemented.  Despite the seeming popularity of his 
National Union for Social Justice, witnessed by the number of branches that grew up almost 
spontaneously across the country, his creation of a new Union Party did not long survive.  It 
suffered an ignominious defeat at the hands of the Democrats in the 1936 election.101  Coughlin’s 
ultimate failure reminds us de Tocqueville’s observation that minor political parties were often 
ineffective, being frequently led by those with “extreme dispositions.”102 
Other radical associations also fared poorly.  Huey Long, a Senator from Louisiana, not 
only proposed the formation of a “Share-Our-Wealth-Society,” but also demanded an 
“expropriation of wealth and nationalization of the [U.S.] banks.”103  George Wolfskill claimed 
that Long was a radical whose “share-the-wealth movement was only a thinly disguised attempt 
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to capture control of the Democratic Party.”104  One can safely conclude that political 
associations that oppose the status quo, by providing noticeably different visions of society, have 
little chance of success. This point was made most emphatically by de Tocqueville almost one 
hundred years before, when he observed that “in America the majority raises formidable barriers 
around the liberty of opinion; within these barriers an author may write what he pleases, but woe 
to him if he goes beyond them.”105  (One must also observe that this is sometimes a good thing.) 
Clause Offe has noted that trade unions during Roosevelt’s presidency represented 
another example of popular civil associations, which in addition also had a far longer period of 
success.106  Between 1933 and 1935 around 400 “company unions” promoted by private-sector 
employers were created.107  According to Joseph Rayback, this type of union was more popular 
than more confrontational, independent unions.108  One critic of Roosevelt, John T. Flynn, 
claimed that many of the more oppositional unions that became popular later on in the New Deal 
often tended towards corruption.  For instance, Flynn asserted that Roosevelt, realizing the 
political uses of the increasing number of people joining labor unions during his first term, 
sought, largely with success, to co-opt them by catering to their interests, even at the expense of 
the rest of the public.109  (This had been aided by the passage of the 1932 Norris-La Guardia 
Anti-Injunction Act which outlawed “[yellow-dog] contracts” that had formerly “required 
employees to agree not to join a union.”)110 
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Just as many Americans who were unable to join unions found themselves economically 
disadvantaged, conservative historian Jonathan Bean claims that small businesses and medium-
sized firms were also seriously hurt by the federal government.  Influenced by such scholars as 
Alan T. Peacock, Jack Wiseman, and Robert Higgs, Bean argues that the interventionist policies 
of the federal government, spurred on by a “crisis rhetoric” that was exaggerated by self-serving 
politicians and employed by political careerists and lobbyists to manipulate the public, were 
successful in their designs to expand government at the expense of smaller businesses.111  
According to historian Burton Folsom Jr., “the major tire makers, Goodyear, Goodrich, and 
Firestone, got together and wrote the NRA tire code.”112  This policy caused tire-prices to rise 
significantly.  Medium-sized firms such as the Pharis Tire and Rubber Company and the Toledo 
Tire Corporation were negatively affected, being unable to offer lower prices that might have 
allowed them a larger place in the market.113  In this way, Roosevelt was able to even 
occasionally co-opt big business through what many considered unfair business practices.  It is 
not surprising that, generally speaking, owners of small businesses were against the policies of 
Roosevelt’s New Deal.114 
It is worth noting that Republican Senator Robert A. Taft of Ohio did try to protect small 
business by advocating the abolition of the capital gains tax.115  Taft and some of his allies 
sought to protect what he characterized as the hard-working ‘little guy’ from the forces of 
political and economic centralization.   
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At the same time, it is important to remember that not a few of the civil associations of 
the era supported the growth of government rather than attempting to limit it.  As Peter Dobkin 
Hall’s account suggests, many, even before the Great Depression, had been associated with and 
promoted by the so-called Progressive movement (a movement supportive of the idea that 
government can be used as a tool against business to solve economic and social problems).116   
There had always been a temptation for private associations to seek government 
assistance, and so, at least to some degree, become co-opted by them.  This tendency to seek 
alliance with government became more pronounced with the Depression, both because of the 
enormity of the problems faced by associations at a time of unprecedented economic collapse, 
and because of the increased willingness of central government to penetrate into so many aspects 
of private life.  In short, Washington, it seemed in the early 1930s, was the only place that had 
both the power and the money to get things done. 
Thus, the National Grange received some support from the Federal government.  
Although the Grange had been suspicious of the Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1938 due to the 
amount of “production control” it gave to the American Farm Bureau Federation (AFDC), a 
separate farming organization sympathetic with the cause of the New Deal, the former was often 
supportive of “many New Deal farm policies.”117  Commentator Jay Cost claimed that in this 
way Franklin Roosevelt helped to create a system “that would mean the creation and 
maintenance of new client groups dependent upon and loyal to the Democratic party.”118 (The 
administration of course also engaged in more traditional kinds of political patronage.  Frank 
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Hague, the mayor of Jersey City, helped ensure votes for Roosevelt after Harry Hopkins gave the 
city $500,000 for direct relief and $50,000,000 for work-relief, the latter in the form of WPA 
programs.)119   
The only notable political civil associations that mounted politically significant assaults 
on the Roosevelt administration were the American Liberty League and the Republican Party.  In 
fact, some have argued that the Liberty League was a more effective contrarian association than 
the Republicans.  George Wolfskill for instance has claimed “that the Liberty League would take 
up the role of administration critic which a moribund Republican Party was unable to fill.”120  
This, in part, as historian Lewis L. Gould explains, had to do with the fact that Republicans from 
the east were more likely to flirt with New Deal theories than Republicans from the West.121  
However, Wolfskill notes that the American Liberty League eventually also became a defunct 
organization, due to the decision of the du Ponts, the major financial contributors to the League, 
to dissolve the association in 1940.  They did this because of “the passage of the second Hatch 
Act limiting contributions to political campaigns.”122  The act was a crucial element in reducing 
the ability of associations hostile to the administration from influencing political life, while at the 
same time demonstrating the ability of the government to affect political outcomes in not very 
subtle ways. 
Due to the activism of civil associations influenced by Progressivism, government 
interventionist policies were not only undertaken by the federal government, but by state 
governments as well.  According to William R. Brock, these also usurped political functions 
previously performed by counties and municipalities.  Brock documents that even before the 
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Depression, government spending throughout the United States on the state level for hospitals, 
education, highways and public welfare was increasing.  Commenting on the rise of ever more 
socially liberal civil associations during the 1930’s, Brock asserts that these radical groups “were 
a minority composed mainly of social workers, public welfare officials, and their academic 
allies.”123   
While August Nimtz, Jr. has labelled Roosevelt a “capitalist,” Chilton Williamson called 
him a “socialist.”  One can say that they were both partially correct.124  The president did not 
promote a pure capitalism that would have allowed for unbridled open-market competition.  
Neither did he come close to out-and-out socialism.  As evidenced by the collusion between 
government elites and tire industries leaders mentioned above, he was instead in favor of a “state 
capitalism” that encouraged cooperation between government and private sector corporate elites 
in both the financial and business sectors of the economy.125  Such inappropriately close relations 
between commerce and government is further illustrated by the Reconstruction Finance 
Corporation that also allowed “the federal government [to make] special loans to banks and 
railroads.”126  
To some degree, this was not unlike what Mussolini had attempted to accomplish in Italy 
in the 1920’s (a resemblance of which Roosevelt was aware.)  This after all was central to the 
notion of corporatism that was supposed to be Fascism’s unique contribution to modern 
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industrial society.127  As economist Robert Higgs observes, it was in any way clear that true 
laissez-faire capitalism had already begun to decline significantly by the end of World War I.128 
Most striking, however, was the fact that cooperation and collusion between the private 
and public sectors was greater after World War II than before.  Ballard Campbell reminds us that 
Roosevelt had actually not been in favor of creating the long term social welfare programs that 
would become so prominent during the period of Lyndon Johnson’s Great Society programs of 
the 1960s.129  For instance, Harry Hopkins of the Federal Emergency Relief Administration 
(FERA) claimed that its purpose was “to see that the unemployed get relief, not to develop a 
great social work organization throughout the United States.”130  Many members of labor unions 
also did not seek to take advantage of a government-administered social welfare program.  
According to Joseph Rayback, members of the AFL “wanted jobs and not a dole.”131  It is also 
worth noting that during this time charity primarily remained both private and local.  According 
to Rayback, “[old] people worked as long as possible; when their strength declined, the family 
assumed the burden of their support.  Church institutions, guilds, mechanics’ societies, and state-
erected poorhouses also supplemented this system” of family support for the elderly.132 
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Franklin Roosevelt had helped create a kind of “state capitalism” that, at least as far as 
Chilton Williamson was concerned, seemed to be a continuation of late-nineteenth century 
“crony capitalism” that served to protect corporations against some of its economic rivals and 
political adversaries.133  Crony capitalism had continued to affect the New Deal era, as Roosevelt 
had made efforts to bail-out banks and other private sector corporations.134 (In Bought and Paid 
For: The Hidden Relationship Between Wall Street and Washington, Charles Gasparino observes 
that this type of collusion between Wall Street and public-sector elites to maintain their power 
and position against what some see as the best interests of the public continues in the twenty-first 
century.)135  While crony capitalism was already an important social reality before the post- 
World War II era (1945-2016), it is also clear that the number of public-sector institutions that 
were created during the latter half of the twentieth century have dwarfed those established during 
the first half, indicating a relentless move towards statism.136  In this period even private sector 
corporations, qua civil associations, seem to have lost some of influence they had during the 
early twentieth century.   
That governmental institutions both bailed out corporations and employed people on a 
larger scale during the last decades of the twentieth century is a well-known fact.  It is also 
reflective of the reality that the public sector has become a significant, and indeed occasionally a 
dominant, part of the American economy as compared to the private sector.  While it was private 
sector corporations that were the megastructures that most affected American society even 
during the Roosevelt years (despite the programs and agencies created by the New Deal), the 
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megastructures that were most responsible for shaping society after the war were governmental 
institutions at the federal, state and even local levels.137   
Although the growth in government was not as substantial during the New Deal Era as 
after, it was a legacy of the Roosevelt administration.  Historian Burton Folsom Jr. observes that 
in fact the Reconstruction Finance Corporation and Works Progress Administration were the 
only agencies that were abolished.  He goes on to note that most of the other Roosevelt programs 
“were continued, expanded, and energized with new federal support.”138 
 The following list, which demonstrates the growth in government during the post-war 
era, is remarkable. It includes the Drug Enforcement Administration, the Environment Protection 
Agency, the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development, the Congressional Budget 
Office, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, the Employment and Training 
Administration, the National Endowment for the Arts, the National Endowment for the 
Humanities, the National Science Foundation, the Occupational Safety and Health 
Administration, the Office of Economic Opportunity, the Office of Federal Contract Compliance 
Programs, the Office of Personnel Management, the Small Business Administration, the 
Department of Education, the institution of food stamp programs (during the Great Society Era), 
mandates for higher minimum wages, Medicaid, Medicare, Temporary Assistance to Needy 
Families (TANF), the Administration for Community Living, the Department of Health and 
Human Services, the Department of Energy, the Urban Renewal Agency and the Department of 
Veteran Affairs.139   
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The list also demonstrates the greater growth of government at the federal, rather than the 
state and local, level.140  Berger and Neuhaus have not only chronicled this, but have also argued 
that it was a product of a liberal political ideology supportive of massive social programs.141  
Aware that social activists have increasingly advocated state-control over many areas of 
American life, Berger and Neuhaus conclude that social liberals believe “[civil associations] 
supply mere palliatives, perpetuate the notion of charity, and otherwise manipulate people into 
[an] acceptance of the status quo.”142  As such, they are not to be trusted.  Consistent with the 
movement towards government control, the liberal movement has increasingly made incursions 
into activities previously reserved for the private sector.  Berger and Neuhaus conclude that this 
has occasionally resulted “in outright prohibitions, repressive taxations, and the imposition of 
licensing and operating standards that have had a punitive effect on non-governmental 
agencies.”143  In other words, government requirements have made it more difficult for non-
government organizations to thrive and survive.  It is not surprising that Robert Higgs fears that 
Progressives want to transform the United States, which he already considers an advanced 
welfare state, into a polity governed by a class of bureaucratic elites.144  There is a danger that it 
will be increasingly difficult to create new and effective civil associations in opposition to big 
government if Higgs’ fears are correct. 
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Although the number of civil associations has grown since the 1830’s, their effectiveness 
and societal influence has not.  Membership in private-sector unions in the United States has for 
instance declined from 36% of the private-sector workforce in 1953 to 10% in 1996.  (This of 
course is related to the decline in manufacturing that has been affected by outsourcing and other 
structural changes in the economy associated with the rise of globalization.)145 
Still, the facts indicate that private-sector unions have lost a significant amount of 
political and economic power at the same time that government expansion has grown 
significantly.  During the 1960s, Great Society programs created during Lyndon B. Johnson’s 
presidency (1963-1969) have included Medicaid, Food Stamps, the 1965 Housing Act, and the 
Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965. At roughly the same time (1965 to 1975) 
government spending as a percentage of GNP dramatically increased from 8% to 24%.146  
Although this had much to do with the Vietnam War, former President Nixon increased 
government spending for domestic public-sector programs as well by pursuing policies such as 
“[raising] social security benefits by 20 percent” before the start of his second presidential 
term.147  Additional public-sector programs that helped create the welfare state were Aid to 
Families with Dependent Children (AFDC), the Bureau of Public Assistance and the Special 
Supplemental Nutrition Program for Women, Infants and Children (WIC).148  This increased 
government activity could not but have helped to weaken the positive role of private civic 
associations that had so animated public life more than a century before.  Associations that 
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suffered decline included such diverse organizations as the NAACP, the General Federation of 
Women’s Clubs and the Grange.149 
The legacy of the Great Society “reforms” was the creation of a vastly larger welfare 
state.  Andrew J.F. Morris notes that the amount of tax revenues spent on public-sector welfare 
was significantly greater than voluntary spending on social welfare for similar charitable 
purposes.150  In the opinion of Jeffrey Charles, the growth in “government paternalism” has 
created a spirit of “civic stagnation” among the American populace.151   
Government continued to grow in the 1970’s.  At the same time unions such as the 
Machinists, the United Auto Workers and AFSCME supported the Democratic Party which they 
correctly understood to be the engine driving increased state power.  Fred Siegel observes that 
public sector unions and interest groups, both supportive of state growth, were also on the rise.  
(Federal employee unions had only first been allowed under the Kennedy administration.  By the 
twenty-first century they were contributing massively to Democratic candidates, who, once in 
office, rewarded federal workers handsomely at the general public’s expense.)152  Associations 
such as teachers’ unions, the AFL-CIO and the National Organization for Women (NOW) 
distinguished themselves by supporting Democratic candidate of Walter Mondale in 1984.153  
Many other seemingly non-political nationally important associations, such as the Sierra Club 
and the National Resources Defense Council, soon learned to depend heavily on grants received 
both directly and indirectly from the federal government.154 This was a prolonged but fatal 
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period for many civil associations. Rather than standing as independent actors outside narrowly 
fought political races, they allowed themselves to become satellites of the Democratic Party.  By 
becoming entirely partisan, they lost much of that independence that de Tocqueville found one of 
the most important roles of associations in grassroots American politics. 
Private businesses were similarly corrupted.  It is revealing of the amount of government 
influence that liberal economist John Kenneth Galbraith considered American businesses in the 
late twentieth century to represent “arms of the welfare state.”155  In other words, some civil 
associations, instead of operating in uneasy relationships with government, actually became 
auxiliaries of the state.  Some prominent, private-sector associations known for espousing social 
liberal causes, such as the Ford Foundation, were also particularly vulnerable in this regard.156 
These trends continued into the 1980’s.  During the presidency of Ronald Reagan (1981-
1989), a politician who portrayed himself as an economic conservative and believer in “trickle-
down” economic policy, government spending as a percentage of the GDP actually went up from 
40% in 1980 to 42% in 1988.  In fact, government spending as a share of GDP reached a zenith 
of 44% in 1986 before it went back down to 42% in 1988.157  While much of this expenditure 
was devoted to increased military spending, the size of the American government, by 1987, had 
grown between “three to six times as large as it was before World War I” according to economist 
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Robert Higgs.158  One can easily conclude that the growth of American government was clearly 
more a legacy of late twentieth-century public policy than anything that had come before it.159 
There are both sociological and historical reasons that account for why government has 
grown so much.  The decline in local community was in part responsible, as government 
replaced social functions previously performed by local and regional social institutions.  Milton 
Friedman, for instance, has observed that the political power that was once vested in local 
communities has declined after World War II.160  In response, Berger and Neuhaus have both 
advocated the formation of “strong neighborhoods” as an important first step towards rebuilding 
the informal groups that might partially reverse this phenomenon.161 
There are examples of civil associations that have been successful in their attempts to 
create close-knit neighborhoods.  Church organizations in Louisiana, such as Christ Church, 
Bethany Church and the Trinity Episcopal Church, are examples of voluntary associations that 
have fostered community-cohesion through providing aid to effected by severe flooding.162  The 
Salvation Army, a Protestant voluntary association that has a reputation for providing relief to 
the poor, has local chapters throughout the United States.163  Loreen Wolfer has argued that the 
formation of neighborhood watch groups in a small, working-class Pennsylvania town 
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established a reputation for both strengthening community-bonds and making the elderly there 
feel safer and more secure.164 
Some associations can also be political while still remaining independent.  The National 
Rifle Association is an organization with chapters throughout the country. It is supported by 
many who share the fears of commentator Ben Shapiro that the end of second amendment rights 
could cause communities throughout the country to become more dangerous and crime-ridden.165  
The Southern Christian Leadership Conference (SCLC), an organization of “African American 
churches to effect political and social change” at the local and grassroots level, cooperated with 
Martin Luther King Jr.’s attempts to challenge both state and federal rulings to ensure both civil 
rights and civil liberties for blacks in the South.166  For a long time it too remained independent 
of government.  Similarly, Cesar Chavez helped create the National Farm Workers’ Association 
(NFWA) in 1962, to help local Hispanic American farm-tenants bargain for higher wages and 
better conditions. (It would later become known as the United Farms Workers (UWA).)167 
Because the formation of “strong neighborhoods” can help reverse the trend to a bigger 
central government, this has raised the ire of social liberals.168  As Berger and Neuhaus note, 
those supportive of centralization are often only too ready to dismiss as backward ethnocentric 
bigots all who seek to preserve neighborhoods, sometimes defined along ethnic lines, in the 
name of community solidarity.169  This is particularly ironic, since liberal community activists 
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have been tireless in creating and increasing community awareness and action in defense of local 
grass roots causes.   Although many social liberals are angered about such defenses of (non-
minority) neighborhood autonomy, many liberal civil associations such as the American Civil 
Liberties Union (ACLU) have added to the controversy by “making it harder to effectively 
prosecute criminals” in many urban communities, causing great distress in tightly knit  
neighborhoods.170  And, generally speaking, many members of the Democratic Party have been 
supportive of the ACLU.171 
Liberal activism has been partly responsible for political centralization in the cities.  
Recently, ACORN, a civil association that has advocated for inexpensive housing and 
neighborhood safety has also gained a reputation for voter-fraud and the occasional terrorization 
of banks.  It avowedly also supported a quasi-Marxist goal of taking control of governmental 
institutions across the country.  It declined rapidly after being suspected of using federal funds 
inappropriately.172  The National Assistance Corporation of America (NACA), a social liberal 
political association with a similar platform, has had a reputation for raucous demonstrations and 
occasional bullying.173 
Centralizing government policies have also affected the state of educational civil 
associations.  Thus, the decline in the number of Catholic elementary and secondary parochial 
schools can in part be accounted for by the refusal of government to allow the use of vouchers 
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and tuition tax-credits.174   Students attending Catholic schools who wish to attend college are 
also obliged to take tests that adhere to federally mandated Common Core standards.175 A new 
Common Core college admissions test known as Parcc (the Partnership for Assessment of 
Reading for College and Careers) has been instituted at the federal level.  Many parents have 
complained that the test is not as challenging as older college-admissions exams such as the SAT 
and ACT.  Although some from lower income backgrounds have supported the new test, those 
critical of it have objected that it lowers standards for education and career-preparation 
throughout the country.176  It is the kind of federal intrusion that local communities, and local 
organizations, find it almost impossible to fight against. 
Most recently, the government has demonstrated a lack of respect for religious 
sensibilities.  Certain institutions, such as the Catholic Church, believe that abortion, abortion 
inducing drugs and the use of contraception to be immoral.  Washington has nonetheless issued a 
Health and Human Services (HHS) mandate requiring all public health facilities (as well as some 
Catholic and other conservative Christian institutions) to provide contraception and abortion 
inducing drugs for their clients.177   
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Health care is another industry affected by big government.  During the New Deal, the 
Red Cross was an effective private sector civil association.178  With the rise of Medicare and 
Medicaid, however, the government has assumed a larger role in health care.  Rosemary Gibson 
and Janardan Prasad Singh remind us that government subsidization of health care industries has 
been part of the Medicare program ever since it was first established in 1965.179  Health care has 
now come under even more federal control through the 2010 Affordable Care Act.180  Gibson 
and Sangh assert that as a result “[collusion] between government and the drug companies, 
device manufacturers, insurers, and hospitals has become even more of a problem.”181  And yet, 
for reasons of self-interest, some civil associations have both supported this bill and continue to 
advocate for its maintenance.  J. James Rohack, former president of the American Medical 
Association (AMA), was among those who looked favorably on its passage.182 
 The growth in government has not only affected purely domestic associations but also 
those with international ties as well.  For instance, a prominent private sector civil association 
service group, the Rotary Club, had often recruited international members through the 1930’s.  
However, Jeffrey Charles has noted that public sector organizations such as the Peace Corps 
assumed their service roles only after the decline of institutions such as Kiwanis, Lions and 
Rotary.  In fact, Jeffrey Charles attributes the decline of these kinds of associations to the 
processes of governmental bureaucratization that has accelerated with every decade.183 
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There have been of course attempts since 1945 to create “intermediary institutions,” 
political associations that mediate between the American people and government by reclaiming 
some of the functions previously performed by local organizations.184 If successful, they could 
both reduce the dependency of the average citizen on government as well as loosen the power of 
the state over people.  Of special note is the Tea Party, a social and political movement initiated 
in 2009 specifically to protest the bailout of financial institutions.185  (This had protected 
irresponsible and incompetent bankers from receiving penalties for their too generous lending 
policies, thus removing any market discipline from financial operations.)186   
According to Fred Siegel, “the Tea Partiers feared the way that big government, big 
business, big media, and a self-serving academia had coalesced in a Chicago-style bulwark of 
crony capitalists.”187  For instance, many members of the Tea Party, supportive of the creation of 
medium-sized and small businesses, were dismayed at how well established and well connected 
associations such as Goldman Sachs and General Motors were bailed out by the government, 
whereas medium-sized businesses were denied such assistance, thus hindering the latter’s ability 
to hire workers or even survive.188  According to economic adviser Kimberly Amadeo, the Tea 
Party also wants to promote the election, or appointment, of individuals who are against the 
further growth of government.189 Most remarkably, this association has remained distinctly 
independent from both major political parties. 
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Williamson also notes, however, that the Tea Party has been mostly unsuccessful.190  
Many conservatives have concluded that elected politicians have pursued policies that have 
primarily benefited themselves and public-sector elites over the interests of most Americans and 
their communities.  For instance, Daniel DiSalvo has concluded that many workers in public 
sector jobs who are members of public sector unions - teachers, police, and firefighters - have 
been the beneficiaries of overly generous pensions paid for by the public in states such as 
California, Florida, Illinois and New York.  (In New York City, sanitation workers in a public-
sector union are paid up to $144,000 per year.)191  According to Fred Siegel, similar pay scales 
and pensions are causing many states to “teeter on the edge of bankruptcy.”192 
Progressives and liberals share the conviction that government programs benefit not 
merely the disenfranchised but all of society.  Conservatives however conclude that the further 
development of the welfare state only reinforces the growth of a sensate society – one that 
increasingly values instant gratification over hard work – that will become an ever more 
entrenched in twenty-first century American life.193  Conservatives view this as running parallel 
with the development of a permanent ruling class of governmental elites who try to co-opt, 
intimidate, or punish dissident, or simply maverick, civil associations.  Thus, for example, the 
IRS has demonstrated a preference for auditing civil associations that were sympathetic to the 
cause of the Tea Party over ones that were not.194 
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There are of course defenders of the growth of government.  John Kenneth Galbraith, in 
his Age of Uncertainty, argues that government intervention is necessary to help people cope 
with an unpredictable and unstable economy.195  Such political and social thought is not only 
popular within academia, but also among an increasing percentage of the larger American 
population, themselves consumed with ever higher material expectations.  This of course has 
political implications.  Most pundits in early November 2016 predicted that Democratic Party 
candidate Hilary Clinton, a strong advocate of the welfare state, was going to defeat Republican 
Donald Trump.196  Although she in fact did not do so due to the peculiar workings of the 
Electoral College, the fact that she won the popular vote is telling.197 
Conservative academics believe that the development of a sensate society brings with it 
many dysfunctional side effects quite independent of a decline in the belief in freedom and self-
reliance.  The prediction by Brigitte and Peter Berger that individuals will increasingly focus 
more on themselves rather than the welfare of others, even their own families, seems to be 
increasingly borne out.198  In part, the rise of narrow self-interest (or “turn toward the subject”) 
has contributed to the general decline in family values.199  This has had a catastrophic effect on 
society.  As Don Eberly observes, males from fatherless households are more likely to commit 
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crimes than those raised in intact nuclear families.200 Children from broken homes are similarly 
less likely to succeed in school.201  
In The War over the Family, the Bergers analyze the causes of this decline.  They claim 
that the rise of a “knowledge class,” that is, a coterie of public-sector elites and professionals 
who both specialize in the production of “academic knowledge,” and view government to be the 
primary vehicle for human development, is partly responsible.202   Conservatives, however, 
believe in the social and cultural importance of the family, which they see as the foundation of a 
healthy society.203  Robert Putnam goes further, suggesting in Bowling Alone, that the weakening 
in family values and social life has played a major role in the decline in local community.   He 
bemoans the loss of social capital, by which he means the loss of social connections that helps 
individuals to survive the vicissitudes of life.  One sees some evidence of this in the fact that 
fewer Americans have become “joiners.”204  To Putnam, this decline in civic engagement has 
been one of the signal characteristics post-World War II era.  For instance, states like New York 
and North Carolina, which both had interventionist state governments during the New Deal 
period, did not have as much “social connectivity” as some other states in the Union during the 
Post-World War II period. 205  
To summarize, this thesis argues that voluntary associations have been weakened by the 
growth of government power and authority, which has increasingly assumed social functions 
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once primarily performed by intermediate institutions and private organizations in the areas of 
family life, neighborhood organization, and religious education. 
 
De Tocqueville Updated: Reflections on Popular Culture, the Growth of the American 
Government, and the Legacy of the New Deal 
 
The United States of the twentieth-first century is increasingly being transformed into a 
nation more accepting of what Robert Bellah et al. have termed a practical and work-centered 
“utilitarian individualism” (valuing utilitarian/instrumental/contractual concerns over 
compassion and community-involvement) and a self-centered “expressive individualism” (or, 
more plainly, hedonism).206  On the other hand, there are still Americans who, without 
necessarily being religious, advocate altruistic moral and philosophical commitments concerned 
with the reformation of society and the morality of its numerous communities.  In his important 
“culture wars” thesis, sociologist James Hunter observes the nature of two separate and 
competing factions with different value-systems and ideologies, and which therefore have 
different visions of the “good society.”  Hunter groups Orthodox Jews, orthodox Catholics, 
Evangelical Protestants and non-religious conservatives into one category.  These believe in 
traditional morality and stress self-reliance. A second category consists of Progressives and 
social liberals who support the growth of secularism in all major areas of society.  They 
especially support a larger and all-embracing welfare state that makes few if any moral demands 
on individuals.207   
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According to Stephen Prothero, this “culture wars” thesis was probably more appropriate 
to the late-twentieth century than the twenty-first.  He accepts that liberals have won against the 
various strains of conservatism (that is, neo-conservatives, right-wing libertarians, traditionalists, 
and all those who advocate the importance of religious values in human conduct).208  Still, there 
are also several kinds of liberalism.  Classical and social liberal thought are not the same.  Social 
liberalism supports both religious and ethnic pluralism as well as big government, while classical 
liberalism, although promoting pluralism, is also supportive of laissez-faire capitalism and 
limited government.  Despite this, some conservatives and traditionalists argue that classical 
liberalism has contributed to the spirit of contemporary decadence and societal decline as much 
as social liberalism.  Ben Shapiro disagrees.  He places the blame squarely on social liberalism, 
with its support of the welfare state.209   
Other conservative and libertarian scholars assume that social liberalism has laid the 
groundwork for other dysfunctional societal effects.  In “The Culture of Poverty,” anthropologist 
Oscar Lewis has argued that a “culture of poverty” has fostered a spirit not only of decadence but 
also of dependence among large numbers of the poor, rather than encouraging civic participation 
and, most importantly, individual responsibility.  According to Lewis, families deeply embedded 
in this “culture of poverty” often “[live] with an obsessive preoccupation with sex, food, and 
drink, clothing and adornment, television and the movies.”210  
Evidence suggests that not only does a culture of poverty exist in the United States, but 
that it has gotten worse since “The Moynihan Report,” an examination of the problem of 
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American poverty, first appeared in 1965.211  Discussing the problem of illegitimate births, 
Daniel Moynihan declared that “24 per cent of all nonwhite births in [1963] were 
illegitimate.”212  In 2014, a government report from the Department of Health and Human 
Services listed the percentage of women in the United States who had out-of-wedlock births: 
29.2% for non-Hispanic whites, 70.9% for non-Hispanic blacks, 65.7 for Amerindians, 16.4% 
for Asians/Pacific Islanders and 52.9% Hispanics.  For the whole population of the United 
States, 40.2% of women had out-of-wedlock births.213 
In Losing Ground, libertarian Charles Murray makes the case that liberal social programs 
have exacerbated such social problems by positively encouraging a spirit of dependence on the 
government.214  It has long been obvious that those individuals strongly tied to religious civil 
associations such as the African Methodist Episcopal church, the Church of God in Christ, the 
African Methodist Episcopal church, and the National Baptist Convention are less likely to 
commit crimes and participate in a culture of poverty than those who are not.215  Other examples 
of civil associations that might be expected to counter this growing decadence would include 
business and fraternal associations like the Kiwanis and Lions Club, religiously-based groups 
like the Knights of Columbus, the YMCA and the YWCA, and more secular interest-group 
organizations such as the NAACP. 
Some conservative scholars have argued that progressive policies have hurt the very 
minority populations that they claim they are intending to help.  James Riley believes African 
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Americans in the United States have fewer opportunities to escape inner city poverty due to the 
social policies and demagoguery of politicians who seek to either expand or maintain the welfare 
state.216   
In the final analysis, conservative thinkers have concluded that both poor whites as well 
as some minorities have suffered from the growth of government.  As such, there are more than a 
few who would agree with de Tocqueville that social policy must promote an overall “equality of 
opportunity” with an eye to the well-being of the entire nation.217  Thus Thomas Sowell has 
argued that programs such as Affirmative Action have helped only those members of minority 
groups who have already achieved middle-class status.  Poor people from disadvantaged 
backgrounds who have not already had reasonable “work experience,” or developed work 
discipline, have not benefited.218  Riley’s observation that “the black poverty rate” fell from 87% 
in 1940 to 47% in 1960s, well before the institution of Affirmative Action programs, is in this 
regard of some interest.219  (Poverty rates fell at a noticeably lower rate after that, remaining at 
31.9% in 1990.)220   
 
Concluding Question: Can the “Mediating Structures” Approach of Peter Berger and 
Richard Neuhaus Revitalize Civil Associations and Bring Back Limited Government in a 
Post-Great Society Era in the United States? 
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It is clear that some kind of welfare state is necessary.  An excessively large one 
supported by some politicians and their social liberal acolytes, either for their political 
advantage, or for ideological reasons, is not.  Social liberals such as Chris Mooney are quick to 
conclude that working-class supporters of the Republican Party are “unenlightened,” racist and 
“reactionary” because they are either religious, resentful of excessive government assistance to 
the poor, or unsuccessful in worldly accomplishments as defined by liberal elites.221  To remedy 
what they see as a lack of economic and social accomplishments, as well as the political and 
cultural confusion and incomprehension they consider to be prevalent among large sectors of the 
American population, social liberals have promoted the example of an “enlightened” 
professional upper-middle class as role models for the unenlightened.  In this way it is hoped that 
American society will become more secular and “value neutral.”222  More specifically, and more 
explicitly semi-socialist, social liberals see the growth of government as the most effective 
means in achieving a prosperous economy and a humane and scientifically-guided society.223   
Such hopes are in stark contrast to some conservatives who place their hope in an 
expanding, vital capitalist economy which they believe will eventually profit everyone.  It is the 
assumption of this thesis that an appreciation of the spirit of religion and traditional morality and 
an appreciation of the spirit of science, advanced technology, and material accomplishments best 
developed through capitalism are not incompatible sentiments.  In order for cultural and human 
capital to have the widest possible effect, more civil associations, whether religious or secular, 
regional or local, have to be created to check and also balance big government, with its 
burgeoning welfare state, and also large private corporations.   
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The central argument is that effective civil associations are necessary for a number of 
reasons.  As locally based groups, they can work against the overweening power of both 
government and nationally based corporations, thus assuring greater individual and local 
freedom.  In this way they can also help ensure that both public and private sectors work for the 
common welfare of the American citizen.  Born out of local initiatives, their very existence 
strengthens community spirit and a greater sense of neighborliness.  This in turn can reduce 
feelings of anomie.  It also can create greater feelings of self-respect that can help reduce crime 
rates, and encourage a greater sense of individual responsibility.   
As previously mentioned, many members of Peter and Brigitte Berger’s knowledge class, 
advocating socially liberal political ideologies imposed from above, are allergic to most grass 
roots movements that do not conform to their preconceived notions of what working and lower 
middle class people are supposed to believe and want. 
These social liberals fall into roughly two categories.  First, there are those who believe 
that the ordinary citizen is not sufficiently “educated” and “enlightened” to make their own life 
choices, and therefore needs government to provide guidance through means of governmental 
regulations.224  Second, there are others such as Arthur Schlesinger Jr. and John Dewey who hold 
a Bancroftian worldview, meaning they believe that human nature is fluid, altruistic, and 
perfectible.  More specifically, they place great hope in public sector institutions, especially 
public schools, which they see as the principle means of “transforming” and educating future 
generations with a “Progressive” outlook.225 
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This thesis does not disparage either of the two ideologies, but it does hold them to be 
incomplete and one-sided.  The one assumes human beings are, at base, mostly rational.  This is 
Bancroftian.  The other, that people are mostly irrational.  Together, this represents the 
assumptions of most “knowledge class” liberals.   
This thesis also assumes that these two inadequate views of human nature can be 
supplemented and balanced against each other.  While recognizing that human beings have a 
static human nature that tends towards selfishness and self-interest, it is also admitted that the 
limits of human nature can be expanded and supplemented to a degree through the incorporation 
of traditional values and virtues, centered around family and local community, which can be 
communicated and transmitted through neighborhood associations.226 
The growth of government both derives from, and has contributed to, the decline in 
community as well as the family.  De Tocqueville was correct when he predicted the inevitable 
growth of government.  He observed that “men readily adopt the notion of a great central 
(governmental) power in ages of equality.”227  With statism and what de Tocqueville called an 
“equality-of-condition” becoming more of a reality, and indeed increasingly regarded as an 
imperative by significant sectors of American people, one must conclude that Tocqueville was 
especially prescient.228  Phillips Bradley, aware of the rise in statist ideologies and the expansion 
of government throughout the world during the early twentieth century, advocated in response an 
increase in the number, status and influence of American civil associations in the manner of de 
Tocqueville.229 
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There are general explanations as to why some individuals support the growth of 
government in the United States.  One is the vested interests of politicians.  De Tocqueville 
asserted that the size and number of governmental institutions would grow because those who 
worked for government often brooded “over advantages they [did] not possess.”230  Bradley not 
only condemns the rise in statism but also the associated rise of materialism that has long 
negatively affected the United States.231 
To some degree, the spread and popularity of a materialistic culture is a reflection of an 
increasingly superficial American value system.  According to Clause Offe, de Tocqueville 
suggested that political centralization engendered the formation of conformist attitudes among 
the American population.232  De Tocqueville in fact did fear that the American people might lose 
“the faculties of thinking, feeling, and action for themselves, and thus gradually [fall] below the 
level of humanity.”233  He asserted that the defects of the egalitarian culture of the United States 
are either leading men “into anarchy” or down the “road to servitude.”234    
It is self-evident that contemporary America has been affected by the growth of the 
welfare state.235  Bradley does chronicle one ironic development.  While political power has long 
been in the hands of Americans who have had formal voting rights, governmental bureaucracies 
have increasingly come to acquire more power in running affairs than have the American people 
through the processes of representative democracy.236   
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To guard Americans against the deleterious effects of excessive government, Berger and 
Neuhaus have advocated the formation of “mediating structures.”237  These they define as 
“institutions standing between the individual in his private life and the large institutions of public 
life,” and include neighborhood groups, churches and the family.238  Berger and Neuhaus, 
however, do not define these merely as a means of reducing government spending and power in 
the United States.  They instead take a more positive stance, suggesting that these structures can 
help direct governmental institutions into pursuing beneficial public policies - - such as the 
disbursement of educational vouchers and tax credits - - while also using resources more 
effectively and efficiently through collaboration with local, non-governmental associations.239   
Given the general acceptance of big government, Berger and Neuhaus assume that it 
would be difficult to convince the public to radically reduce the size of the bureaucracy.  They 
advocate the concept of mediating structures partly because it is more realistic for community 
groups to negotiate with government rather than to make futile demands for radical libertarian 
reforms.  In this regard, Chilton Williamson has opined that populist protest movements across 
the political spectrum, from the People’s Party of 1892 to the Tea Party today, have generally 
been unsuccessful in realizing their respective reformist visions.240 
Although many contemporary Americans rail against the size of government, many 
others continue to advocate its growth.  One has only to reflect on how many Americans, 
especially members of the Democratic Party, are deeply involved in a self-interested, quasi-
patronage system that ensures them good salaries and pension and health benefits if they support 
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the right candidates.241  Many more, of course, are not.  Thus, it falls to the latter to navigate the 
labyrinthine political and economic system in order to find a satisfactory career without the 
political patronage associated with government sponsorship. 
Both Berger and Neuhaus propose practical measures that are intended to not only make 
people more aware of broader economic and social opportunities, but also to improve society at 
the same time.  In an effort to provide quality education for all, especially for minority 
populations, they suggest that educational vouchers or tuition tax credits be given to individual 
families.  American citizens would thus have the option of sending their children to privately-
owned primary and secondary schools that, in many cases, provide a superior education to that in 
public schools.  To pursue this specific end, Berger and Neuhaus advocate the creation of more 
private schools of various kinds.242 
In a recent book, Charles Murray has argued that a reduction in welfare payments would 
reduce dependency by forcing the unemployed to find the best available employment.  For 
Murray, even starting at a minimum-wage job creates pride, self-sufficiency and can lead over 
time to self-improvement.  Murray’s vision is “libertarian” and assumes that the creative 
potential of the individual can be unleashed when freed from dependency on government.243  
Note should be taken of former House of Representatives member Jack Kemp’s proposal to 
create “enterprise zones” in inner-cities by providing generous tax breaks for those individuals 
interested in starting businesses.244 
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Although Alexis de Tocqueville believed that there is hope for America, he nevertheless 
was afraid a self-absorbed population is naturally prone to ignoring threats to the survival of its 
civilization.245  According to Offe, Max Weber, like de Tocqueville, feared the consequences of 
the growth of bureaucracy.  Suggesting the influence of de Tocqueville on Weber, Offe discusses 
the latter’s perception that American society, and indeed the entire West, may be trapped in an 
“iron cage of dependence” that threatens the existence of political rights, political liberties, and 
free thought.246   
As early as 1962, Milton Friedman reminded the American public that a massive amount 
of political power had accrued to the Federal government.247  Yet this growth is not necessarily 
irreversible.  Many individual states and communities have reduced state and local government 
expenditures during the 2010’s.  In other words, many states are trying to keep themselves 
solvent by only paying for those programs they can afford.  Such cuts indicate that there are still 
local politicians who are responsibly attempting to ensure financial integrity for the future of 
their communities.248  
This suggests that at least some American political leaders are not only showing signs of 
fiscal responsibility, but are also demanding more personal responsibility.  That they are doing so 
in opposition to the general popular belief in big government (i.e. majority-tyranny) is cause to 
give individual citizens some hope for the survival of earlier American ideals.  In To Empower 
the People, Berger and Neuhaus likewise speculate about the possibility of a “Neo-Jeffersonian” 
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movement that can give ordinary people some say in reducing the amount of government 
spending and regulations in the United States.249   
The American public can do its part by creating civil associations that, among other 
goals, are supportive of the creation and success of small businesses.  A shift in American 
attitudes that could result in a proliferation of local civil associations can encourage public 
policies that advocate small businesses creation, as an alternative to the current championing of 
either big government or big business, as the best solution for some economic problems.  
Historian Jonathan J. Bean claims that in the late nineteenth century there was more coexistence 
between small and big business.  He also applauds the resiliency of many small businesses in 
more modern times despite the federal taxation and overregulation that have threatened their 
continued existence.  He happily observed the ability of small businesses in the 1980s to more 
quickly discern consumer preferences and adapt to them faster than big businesses.250 
Reducing both taxation and the amount of governmental regulations imposed on small 
business may be the means by which unemployment can be significantly reduced.  Cutting taxes 
and regulations can give individuals a chance to either start their own companies which naturally 
would involve the hiring of the unemployed or underemployed.251  Individuals would in this way 
acquire social skills associated with work as well as “hands-on” business experience.  
Additionally, engaging in the hard work and concentration that small business demands would 
necessarily require Americans to fight against the moral laxity of a sensate society.  American 
citizens would thus be in a better position to create real wealth both for their fellow citizens and 
for themselves.  Conversely, increased employment opportunities provided by a revitalized 
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economy could help citizens avoid becoming dependent on governmental institutions that, 
unintentionally or not, foster a spirit of helplessness among the general population.   
Civil associations are products of the same energetic and enterprising spirit that animates 
small business.  They are the expression of the desire of people to take their lives into their own 
hands, and commit both time and effort to making their local communities better.  Alexis de 
Tocqueville came out of a French society that in the 1830s was still haunted by the massacres 
and mob violence that characterized the most terrible European political upheaval of the previous 
hundred years – the French Revolution.  He feared that democracy could, as in France, lead to 
mass brutality and murder.  He feared the ferocity of the mob.  This is one of the reasons why the 
workings of American democracy so fascinated him.252  He saw the organization of civil 
associations scattered widely among the largely disunited American states as a guarantee against 
the centrally organized terror that emanated from Paris under the inspiration of Robespierre and 
the Paris based Committee of Public Safety.253  In fact, he need not have feared that kind of 
tyranny in America. 
Ironically, the greatest threat to the American Republic has not been the unbridled violent 
passions of revolutionaries, but the development of a sensate, politically slothful nation 
excessively dependent on government to provide them with the good things of life.  It is not 
ferocity that is the greatest danger to the American Republic, but the passivity of citizens 
unwilling to commit either the time or energy to creating the civil associations that allow free 
people to govern their own communities without the interference of outside government 
authority.  De Tocqueville understood the importance of such groups.  He also saw how a 
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preference for equality over liberty and individualism might weaken both civil associations and 
the Republic.  It remains to be seen if some future resurgence of civil associations and the 
individual initiative that creates them can overcome the political and social decay fostered by big 
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